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Abstract. Often the hardest job is to get business representatives to look at 
security as something that makes managing their risks and achieving their 
objectives easier, with security compliance as just part of that journey. This paper 
addresses that by making planning for security services a ‘business tool’. 
Recognising that no single approach for employing security services will ever meet 
every need, the authors focus on a high-level approach with low initial and on-
going resource cost. The result is a common basis for business representatives and 
security practitioners to discuss the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of protecting IT systems for 
the outyears.  Business representatives are provided with a basis to assist in 
sourcing funding and the potential for grouping blocks of security work allows for 
saving on resource costs. During the development and refinement of the approach 
the authors unearthed other benefits that are also presented. 
1. Introduction 
The application of security services for an IT system has often been done in an ad-hoc way, 
either only in response to incidents or as part of system development. It is recognised, 
however, that as risks change over time, a more organised and consistent approach is needed to 
manage changes in risks to system operation and information. The approach here uses a so-
called Plan of Security Services for an IT System (or Plan).  
 
Risk owners themselves are usually reliant on security practitioners for advice concerning the 
security services they need to apply. At the same time organisational security practitioners 
rarely have budgets to cover anything beyond implementation of the organisation wide security 
programme. So communication between risk owners and security is normally required to agree 
the security services performed for IT systems. 
 
The approach for organising, communicating and managing security services for IT systems 
described herein was developed initially in response to a need to include business owners in a 
process that results in describing an appropriate level of security services for a system. Original 
objectives were to collect relevant information regarding an IT system’s security and use this to 
plan security services in a way that indicated gaps, facilitated communication between key 
parties, was simple to implement, could meet policy requirements and assisted budget and 
work planning. Other benefits uncovered through the implementation of the approach are also 
outlined below in the discussion section below. 
 
Some related approaches were found through review of literature and general enquiries. Some 
organisations have reported the inclusion of security services as part of an IT system plan or 
roadmap. However these have not contained the context information or reference section as 
described here and is found in more risk mature sectors such as the mining and resource sector 
(where risk management has long been a primary business consideration).                                                          
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The approach has similarities to that presented in [1]. In [1] the author proposes the use of 
control groups from NIST SP 800-53 [2] for implementing a roadmap for organisational level 
security. The NIST SP 800-53 approach can be used for IT system security as well with the 
controls split across common controls, so called system specific controls or hybrid controls. 
See also NIST SP 800-18 [3] and the related guide [4] which focus on system security plans as 
distinct from a plan for security services for an IT system. 
 
As stated above with existing approaches found in certain industry sectors, the context 
information gathered is not as extensive or in a centralised system specific form. These 
approaches also lack a plan for security services and the work required to get underway is 
initially larger. A Statement of Applicability against ISO 27001/2 [7]/[8], the NZISM (New 
Zealand Information Security Manual) [5] or its parent manual the Australian ISM 
(Information Security Manual) [6] could also be regarded as having similarities, but have 
similar limitations to those of using NIST SP 800-53.  
 
No one approach for employing security services will ever meet every need. The intent here is 
to describe an approach with low initial and on-going resource costs and where engagement 
with the risk and business representatives is underway early and an objective of the approach. 
A focus of this approach is to facilitate co-operation and communication between security 
practitioners and business representatives. As is always the case, the security practitioner must 
determine the practicality of an approach to their situation and also weigh up the expected 
benefits and costs. 
 
The approach herein describes what to do based on a template showing how it can be done. 
The template is divided into two main parts: one being the business and related risk context 
and reference documentation relevant to the system's security, the other being the systems 
security service plan which is built by the security practitioner based on the information from 
the first part. These two parts are discussed below with reference to the template in Appendix 
A. The benefits of the approach are then discussed. 
2. Part 1 – Framing Security within the Business and Risk Context 
The first part of the Plan covers the business and risk context information relevant to the IT 
systems security as defined by the risk owner and suitable business representatives. It also 
covers all the security documentation and reports relevant to the IT system. The intention is not 
to get fixated on the information-gathering phase but rather begin to build the picture with the 
important risk and business representatives to get the Plan underway. A rough guide is to spend 
a few hours (including interviews with the risk and/or business representatives) rather than a 
few days building the Plan. 
 
• Section 1 – High Level Information: records the basic details of the IT system and 
stakeholders. 
• Section 2 – Assumptions: lists assumptions relevant to the Plan. Examples are included 
such as the Plan not forming an agreement covering funding, scheduling etc. (but forms a 
basis for such to occur). 
• Section 3 – Business Context Information Relevant to Security: gathers simple business 
context information affecting security requirements for the IT system used to inform the 
Plan and provide rationale. For example if system availability were critical for business 
operation this would imply that Business Continuity Planning (BCP) is an important area. 
In this section, under “business impact” the use of the organisation’s risk criteria, as 
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defined in the organisation’s corporate Risk Management Framework indicates how 
important the business operations are that rely on the IT system. This approach is pragmatic 
and broadly consistent with standards like [9], [2] and [10], whilst having lower 
complexity. The method of evaluation used to determine and record business impact ratings 
should be consistent across the organisation as this aids communication. 
• Section 4 – System Documentation and Reports: collects the relevant documentation and 
previous security assessment reports. This could form part of a broader asset management 
plan, but it can be useful to have a dedicated view of the security relevant documents. Note 
this can be a good starting point as the documents and reports can provide context 
information to fill in Part 1 – especially if risk assessments, system operation guides and 
other documents with relevant detail are available. 
• Section 5 – Other Details: gathers pertinent information for setting the security context for 
the system that does not fit under headings above. For example system dependencies can be 
critical to consider when determining the system security context, but are often overlooked 
by business and/or risk representatives and not captured under documentation.  
• Section 6 – Acknowledgements: is optional and used where clarity of the information needs 
to be formalised. Note however that acknowledgements are not the focus for the Plan and 
should not delay development or commencement of activities. The only bureaucratic 
barriers that really count are those that come with funding and scheduling. The idea here is 
to get to that point as rapidly as possible, not add any delays. So acknowledgements should 
not detract from the real focus points. 
3. Part 2 – Security Service Planning and Schedule 
Part 2 is where the security practitioner presents their overview of the required security 
services for discussion with the risk owner and business representatives. Section 6 of the 
template contains the table for security service planning. This example has listed Service 
Options based on the NZISM [5] with the addition of Privacy Impact Assessments. The listed 
Service Options may be based on any relevant published standard or an organisation’s own 
listing. 
 
The security practitioner uses the information from Part 1 to determine the frequency with 
which each security service should be performed along with an explanation of why this is the 
case under the Rationale. Note this includes requirements as dictated by applicable legislation, 
policy and standards as collected under Section 5. For our example the NZISM requires system 
certification every 2-3 years and so the example Plan coverage shown has been designed to 
achieve only this. 
 
The table in Section 6 does not specifically identify projects, but rather focuses on significant 
changes to the system as a trigger for undertaking a particular security service, for example a 
significant software upgrade. The reason for this is a project itself may not trigger the 
requirement for a particular security service. The table is focused towards the on-going 
frequency of security services to be applied to a system in a manner that is agnostic of the 
System Development Lifecycle (SDLC) whilst noting that changes to an existing system can 
also trigger the need for some security services to be performed. 
 
Section 7 of the template is then completed by constructing a schedule of the security services 
to be performed over a relevant period providing foresight for business planning, in this 
example a 2-3 year period to cover the 2-3 year system certification requirement of the 
NZISM. Guidelines for estimating hours are provided in a separate table. The schedule and 
hours should be estimates as the focus is not to spend too much time fine-tuning details, but 
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rather to assist the conversation with the risk owner and business representatives and in turn 
their budget and work planning. 
 
In this case projects are best broken down under their own schedule as for one thing a project 
budget is usually separate from the on-going operational budget. The production system 
schedule can take account of security services performed under projects. For example, a 
penetration test when performed on a system immediately after putting the project changes in 
to production, can defer the need for further production system penetration testing as per the 
frequency requirement given in Section 6. This however must be carefully monitored in terms 
of project delays or cancellations to ensure appropriate testing and assessment is performed in a 
timely way on the production system irrespective of any project changes. 
 
As already noted above, but worth repeating, the preparation of a Plan should be in the order of 
a few hours not days. Once a Plan is prepared it should be used to engage with the risk owner, 
business representatives and other relevant parties to agree on the security services performed 
along with the funding and a schedule. This agreement may be formalised through existing 
mechanisms the organisation employs, such as a memorandum. The focus should be to get 
things underway, especially the conversations and relationships between security and business 
and risk representatives and some work from the Plan, not to have everything in a Plan agreed 
before any work commences. The Plan itself remains a living document and should be updated 
accordingly and utilised in the on-going engagement and communication between the parties. 
4. Discussion 
The approach herein of using a single Plan to gather the business and risk context information 
relevant to security for an IT system along with simple rationale and schedule for security 
services to be performed on an IT system has the following benefits. 
 
1. Low initial and on-going maintenance costs in terms of time and resource requirements. 
2. Provides a way to engage and communicate with key parties such as risk owners, business 
representatives, project managers and IT system managers. 
3. Provides a basis for agreeing funding and scheduling of security services for an IT system. 
4. Is flexible to meet the organisations requirements be it formal as with system certification 
requirements in the NZISM or informal requirements the organisation may define. 
5. Is flexible to incorporate changes bought about through projects or other system or 
organisational changes. 
6. Provides a useful source of security relevant references (context information, 
documentation and reports) for the IT system. 
7. Provides a basis for reporting to risk owners and other business representatives and 
maintaining these communication channels over time. 
8. Assists risk owners communicating with auditors, service customers and stakeholders that 
due diligence is been performed in terms of risk management. 
9. Enables the collection of schedules from multiple Plans for security management to obtain 
an overview of IT systems security services to track progress, manage resourcing and to 
obtain discounts through scale by collecting work where external security service providers 
are utilised (see Appendix B). 
Many of the points have been discussed already or are apparent. We specifically cover 4 and 7-
9 in further detail here. Further to 4 above this approach can be used to meet a number of 
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government requirements: in connection to the NZISM it can be an input to a System Security 
Risk Management Plan and used to assist with achieving system certification [5], with the New 
Zealand Government Web Toolkit Guidance on Security ad Privacy Management it contributes 
to aspects of the quality assurance framework [11] and the mandatory requirement INFOSEC6 
of [12]. 
 
With 7 it has been noted that the Plan itself provides a basis for facilitating communication 
with risk owners and business representatives. It can also be used as part of on-going reporting 
to these stakeholders, for example as part of a larger collective specific IT system report or for 
high level reporting covering general IT system security. 
 
With 8 as the information in the Plan itself is not overly sensitive, it may be more broadly 
circulated than individual security assessments and reports and used to provide assurance to 
auditors, service customers and stakeholders that security and risk are being well managed and 
assist with showing that the risk owner is performing due diligence. It is evidence that on-
going risk management is being undertaken by appropriate parties. 
 
The final point 9 notes that multiple Plan schedules can be collated as shown in the sample IT 
systems resourcing and progress plan overview of Appendix B. This overview assists with 
management of delivery and resourcing of the security services. It also assists with the 
grouping of blocks of work for obtaining better rates when external service providers are 
sourced. For example: the penetration testing and vulnerability assessment for Project 1-IT 
system A, IT system C and Project 3-IT system D in the April-July 2014 period may be put out 
for bids collectively, saving resource time and encouraging vendors to return competitive bids 
to secure the work. 
 
Finally note that although simple tables have been used in the examples provided in 
appendices, the approach can be implemented in this way or using management applications or 
tools already in place within the organisation or IT business. The tables used here are the 
minimum required to demonstrate the approach. 
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Appendix A – Sample of Security Services for an IT System 
1 High Level Information 
System name The name of the IT system covered in the Plan 
System risk owner The name and position of the risk owner for the business operations that the 
IT system supports 
System service 
owner 
The names and position of the business managers for the main business 
operation or services that the IT system supports 
System IT operation 
manager 
The name and position of the IT operational manager for the IT system 
Project X manager The name and position of the project manager for Project X 
System users Brief description of the business users of the IT system (or related services) 
Other stakeholders List of any other business risk stakeholders 
Document 
information 
The name and position of the preparer of the Plan and the date it was 
prepared (to include detail to define versions) 
2 Assumptions The following assumptions relate to this Plan: 
• This Plan does not take account of costs, scheduling, or prioritisation for the security services  proposed  but  rather  provides  a  basis  for  such  considerations  to  be undertaken 
• The  risk  owner  retains  ultimate  accountability  and  responsibility  for  risk  decisions relating  to  the  business  operations  and  the  sourcing  of  IT  system  support  for  those business operations 
• Any other assumptions specific to the Plan for the particular IT system. 
3 Business Context Information Relevant to Security 
Business Aspect Details 
Business 
description and 
objectives as 
related to the IT 
system 
A ‘set the scene’ description of the business and how the IT system supports 
these along with the details of specific business objectives that the IT system must 
meet. 
Business Impact The business impact ratings relevant to the organisations corporate risk criteria 
CIAP (Critical, 
Highly Important, 
Important, Some 
Importance, 
Unimportant, Not 
Applicable) 
Confidentiality: 
List ratings as 
judged by 
business risk 
owner. 
Integrity: Availability: Privacy: 
The most important requirement in terms of information protection is: information 
protection requirement as judged by the business risk owner. 
Information 
classification 
The classification of the information that resides on or is transferred by the IT 
system as per the organisations information classification policy. 
Planned system 
development 
activities 
Next 6 months Next 6-12 months Next 12-24 
months 
Next 24-36 months 
List any planned 
items. 
   
Would changes in the business context affect the IT systems security profile? Yes/No 
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4 System Documentation and Relevant Reports 
Document/Report Type (include document and report titles 
where relevant) 
Document and 
Report 
Location/Link 
Date 
Ve
rif
ie
d 
Existing Plan of Security Services for the IT system: Document file 
number and/or 
link 
Month 
and 
year 
Y/N 
Number of security incidents or privacy breaches in previous 12 
months (include direction to reports): 
   
System Operating Guide:    
System Security Plan    
BCP and Disaster Recovery Plan (include direction to test results):    
Risk Assessments:    
Privacy Impact Assessments:    
Design Reviews:    
Penetration Tests:    
Vulnerability Assessments:    
Code Reviews:    
Certifications:    
IT General Control Assessments:    
Physical Security Assessments:    
Other (as applicable to the IT system security):     
5 Other Details  
Dependencies The other systems this system is reliant on: 
 
The other system that rely on this system: 
 
Rationale for 
employing 
security 
services 
The risk owner requires positive assurance? Y/N 
System reports directly to stated organisational outcomes (e.g. features in 
Statement of Intent, Annual Report etc.)? 
Y/N 
Disaster Recovery/resilience measures have been tested in the last 12 
months?  
Y/N 
System contains or transfers information with a security classification? Y/N 
System has automated transaction interfaces with external entity systems or 
is a point of information aggregation? 
Y/N 
System is internet facing? Y/N 
Other drivers (explain) 
Top 3 Future 
Risks  
List top three business risks to operation from the risk owners point of view. 
Applicable 
Legislation, 
Policy and 
Standards 
List the primary applicable legislation, policy and standards the IT system must 
comply with. 
Control 
Landscape 
Record any relevant control description or categorisation. (These may be only 
available in a high level form through to having detailed control documentation.) For 
example it may be helpful to record that only detective and compensating controls 
are used and that there is an absence of preventative controls and why this is so.  
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6 Acknowledgements  
Name and Position Signature Date 
Name and position of risk 
owner 
 
As risk owner of the business operations utilising this IT 
System I have reviewed and confirm the information 
given above with respect to my business risks: 
 
 
 
 
Name and position of IT 
security head 
 
As the IT security head I have reviewed and confirm the 
information as given above as relevant to IT security for 
this IT system: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7  Security Service Planning for IT System 
Service Area Service Option Frequency Rationale3 
Information Security 
Risk Management 
Information Classification Evaluation Where required To occur whenever significant changes to the information assets held, transferred or processed are made. 
IT Risk Assessment Every 2 years or when 
significant changes occur 
A risk assessment for the IT System A (covering relevant aspects of Project 1) was performed in February 2015. A risk assessment must be 
performed every two years as part of the system certification and accreditation. 
Privacy Impact Assessment Where design changes 
require 
A Privacy Impact Assessment should be conducted when design changes with material impacts to privacy protections are planned. Refer also 
Security Design/Architecture review.  
Vulnerability Assessment Every year or when 
significant changes occur 
To occur annually with penetration testing to review the status of vulnerabilities associated with the system or where significant changes to the 
system occur. 
Penetration Testing Every year of when 
significant changes occur 
To be performed annually or when significant changes to the system occur that may introduce new vulnerabilities.  
Code Review Where significant changes 
are made to the system code 
To occur whenever significant changes to the system code are made (as with Project 1). 
Security Incident Management Every 3 months Regular security incident reporting to be provided. Planning to include provision for this and an occurrence of 1-2 incidents a year. 
Physical Security Assessment Every 2 years or when 
significant changes occur 
The physical security of the hosting data centre must be reviewed every 2 years or when significant site changes occur. A physical security review 
was performed in January 2015. 
Security Compliance Security Design/Architecture Review Where design changes 
require 
To occur whenever significant changes to the system design are made (as with Project 1). 
System Audit Every 2 years or when 
significant changes occur 
A system audit must be performed as part of system certification or where significant changes are made. 
Compliance Documentation Every 2 years or when 
significant changes occur 
Certification report and related documentation to be created as part of system certification – refer Certification below. 
Certification Every 2 years or when 
significant changes occur 
Certification is required to be performed every 2-3 years to meet compliance requirements. Certification is also triggered whenever significant 
changes to the IT system are made. 
Functional Testing (Security) Where design changes 
require 
Where incident management 
identifies weaknesses 
No special requirement. 
Security Governance Security Governance Framework When changes require Planned to occur as part of next certification cycle to cover recent organisational and system security governance and external audit and reporting 
requirements. 
Policy and Standards  When changes require No special requirement. 
Security Awareness Training When changes require No special requirement. 
Business Continuity Planning At least one exercise a year. BCP and IT Service Continuity is in place but newly implemented so a comprehensive exercise is planned and followed by annual test and 
reviews to ensure availability requirements are met.  
                                                        
3 For the purpose of the example we loosely used a fictitious system that: is subject to NZISM; operates within a changing organisational environment; has defined availability requirement; contains some custom code; holds some private data; and requires some 
protection from hostile networks to which it connects. 
  
8  Security Service Delivery Schedule for IT System A with Project 1 
 Schedule Summary 
 2015 2016 2017 
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Estimate hours 
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Total hours by month 40 60 4   4 80 40 24   4   4   4 10  4   4 40 40 4   4 
Total hours by budget year 108 156 106 
Project 1 schedule 
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D
R
 
 C
R
 
P
T,
 V
A
 
P
T,
 V
A
 
                        
Estimate hours  
 40
 
 40
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+1
0 
20
+1
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Total hours by month  40  40 50 30                         
Total hours by budget year 160 - - 
Overall budget year total hours  268 156 125     
 
Abbreviation for Service Option Guidelines for Estimating Sum Total Hours for all Participants 
ICE Information Classification Evaluation 10 hours for a stand alone system up to 20 hours for a complex system 
RA IT Risk Assessment 40 hours for a stand alone system up to 160 hours for a complex system 
PIA Privacy Impact Assessment 40 hours for a stand alone system up to 160 hours for a complex system 
VA Vulnerability Assessment 10 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
PT Penetration Testing 40 hours for a stand alone system up to 100 hours for a complex system 
CR Code Review 40 hours for a stand alone system up to 100 hours for a complex system 
SIM Security Incident Management Determined on a system by system basis 
PSA Physical Security Assessment 20 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
SDR Security Design/Architecture Review 20 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
SA System Audit 40 hours for a stand alone system up to 200 hours for a complex system 
CD Compliance Documentation 40 hours and up to 80 hours depending on certification 
SC Security Certification 20 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
FTS Functional Testing (Security) 40 hours for a stand alone system up to 160 hours for a complex system 
SGF Security Governance Framework Determined on a system by system basis 
P&S Policy and Standards  20 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
SAT Security Awareness Training 20 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
BCP Business Continuity Planning 20 hours for a stand alone system up to 80 hours for a complex system 
  
Appendix B – Sample IT Systems Resourcing and Progress Plan Overview 
  Schedule Summary 
  2015 2016 2017 
IT System Name (Including 
Related Projects) 
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IT System A A. Bloggs PSA RA SIM   SIM BCP SGF SC   SIM   SIM   SIM BCP  SIM   SIM PSA RA SIM   SIM 
  ICE      SA CD SIM                      
                                
Project 1   SDR  CR PT PT                         
      VA VA                         
Project 2          SDR  CR PT PT                  
          PIA   VA VA                  
IT System B (external system) B. Bloggs   SIM   SIM   SIM SC  SIM   SIM PSA  SIM   SIM   SIM   SIM   SIM 
IT System C C. Bloggs PSA  BCP RA PT  SA SC       BCP  PT        PSA  BCP   RA 
      VA  CD          VA              
IT System D B. Bloggs PSA    BCP   SA CD SC      PT BCP   RA     PSA   PT BCP  
Project 3    RA PT                            
Key 
Completed 
Funded 
Proposed  
